Thursday, September 9, 2010

Scientific and religious knowledge

Tim Crane, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, on
scientific and religious knowledge and belief:

New York Times, September 5, 2010

There is a story about Bertrand Russell giving a public lecture
somewhere or other, defending his atheism. A furious woman stood up at
the end of the lecture and asked: "And Lord Russell, what will you say
when you stand in front of the throne of God on judgment day?" Russell
replied: "I will say: 'I'm terribly sorry, but you didn't give us
enough evidence.' "

This is a very natural way for atheists to react to religious claims:
to ask for evidence, and reject these claims in the absence of it.
Many of the several hundred comments that followed two earlier Stone
posts "Philosophy and Faith" and "On Dawkins's Atheism: A Response,"
both by Gary Gutting, took this stance. Certainly this is the way that
today's "new atheists" tend to approach religion. According to their
view, religions — by this they mean basically Christianity, Judaism
and Islam and I will follow them in this — are largely in the business
of making claims about the universe that are a bit like scientific
hypotheses. In other words, they are claims — like the claim that God
created the world — that are supported by evidence, that are proved by
arguments and tested against our experience of the world. And against
the evidence, these hypotheses do not seem to fare well.

Religion commands and absorbs the passions and intellects of hundreds
of millions of people, many more people than science does. Why is
this?
But is this the right way to think about religion? Here I want to
suggest that it is not, and to try and locate what seem to me some
significant differences between science and religion.

To begin with, scientific explanation is a very specific and technical
kind of knowledge. It requires patience, pedantry, a narrowing of
focus and (in the case of the most profound scientific theories)
considerable mathematical knowledge and ability. No-one can understand
quantum theory — by any account, the most successful physical theory
there has ever been — unless they grasp the underlying mathematics.
Anyone who says otherwise is fooling themselves.

Religious belief is a very different kind of thing. It is not
restricted only to those with a certain education or knowledge, it
does not require years of training, it is not specialized and it is
not technical. (I'm talking here about the content of what people who
regularly attend church, mosque or synagogue take themselves to be
thinking; I'm not talking about how theologians interpret this
content.)

What is more, while religious belief is widespread, scientific
knowledge is not. I would guess that very few people in the world are
actually interested in the details of contemporary scientific
theories. Why? One obvious reason is that many lack access to this
knowledge. Another reason is that even when they have access, these
theories require sophisticated knowledge and abilities, which not
everyone is capable of getting.

Yet another reason — and the one I am interested in here — is that
most people aren't deeply interested in science, even when they have
the opportunity and the basic intellectual capacity to learn about it.
Of course, educated people who know about science know roughly what
Einstein, Newton and Darwin said. Many educated people accept the
modern scientific view of the world and understand its main outlines.
But this is not the same as being interested in the details of
science, or being immersed in scientific thinking.

Taken as hypotheses, religious claims do very badly. Yet the striking
fact is that this does not worry Christians.
This lack of interest in science contrasts sharply with the worldwide
interest in religion. It's hard to say whether religion is in decline
or growing, partly because it's hard to identify only one thing as
religion — not a question I can address here. But it's pretty obvious
that whatever it is, religion commands and absorbs the passions and
intellects of hundreds of millions of people, many more people than
science does. Why is this? Is it because — as the new atheists might
argue — they want to explain the world in a scientific kind of way,
but since they have not been properly educated they haven't quite got
there yet? Or is it because so many people are incurably irrational
and are incapable of scientific thinking? Or is something else going
on?

Some philosophers have said that religion is so unlike science that it
has its own "grammar" or "logic" and should not be held accountable to
the same standards as scientific or ordinary empirical belief. When
Christians express their belief that "Christ has risen," for example,
they should not be taken as making a factual claim, but as expressing
their commitment to what Wittgenstein called a certain "form of life,"
a way of seeing significance in the world, a moral and practical
outlook which is worlds away from scientific explanation.

This view has some merits, as we shall see, but it grossly
misrepresents some central phenomena of religion. It is absolutely
essential to religions that they make certain factual or historical
claims. When Saint Paul says "if Christ is not risen, then our
preaching is in vain and our faith is in vain" he is saying that the
point of his faith depends on a certain historical occurrence.

Theologians will debate exactly what it means to claim that Christ has
risen, what exactly the meaning and significance of this occurrence
is, and will give more or less sophisticated accounts of it. But all I
am saying is that whatever its specific nature, Christians must hold
that there was such an occurrence. Christianity does make factual,
historical claims. But this is not the same as being a kind of
proto-science. This will become clear if we reflect a bit on what
science involves.

The essence of science involves making hypotheses about the causes and
natures of things, in order to explain the phenomena we observe around
us, and to predict their future behavior. Some sciences — medical
science, for example — make hypotheses about the causes of diseases
and test them by intervening. Others — cosmology, for example — make
hypotheses that are more remote from everyday causes, and involve a
high level of mathematical abstraction and idealization. Scientific
reasoning involves an obligation to hold a hypothesis only to the
extent that the evidence requires it. Scientists should not accept
hypotheses which are "ad hoc" — that is, just tailored for one
specific situation but cannot be generalized to others. Most
scientific theories involve some kind of generalization: they don't
just make claims about one thing, but about things of a general kind.
And their hypotheses are designed, on the whole, to make predictions;
and if these predictions don't come out true, then this is something
for the scientists to worry about.

For the religious, mysteries are accepted as a consequence of what
makes the world meaningful.
Religions do not construct hypotheses in this sense. I said above that
Christianity rests upon certain historical claims, like the claim of
the resurrection. But this is not enough to make scientific hypotheses
central to Christianity, any more than it makes such hypotheses
central to history. It is true, as I have just said, that Christianity
does place certain historical events at the heart of their conception
of the world, and to that extent, one cannot be a Christian unless one
believes that these events happened. Speaking for myself, it is
because I reject the factual basis of the central Christian doctrines
that I consider myself an atheist. But I do not reject these claims
because I think they are bad hypotheses in the scientific sense. Not
all factual claims are scientific hypotheses. So I disagree with
Richard Dawkins when he says "religions make existence claims, and
this means scientific claims."

Taken as hypotheses, religious claims do very badly: they are ad hoc,
they are arbitrary, they rarely make predictions and when they do they
almost never come true. Yet the striking fact is that it does not
worry Christians when this happens. In the gospels Jesus predicts the
end of the world and the coming of the kingdom of God. It does not
worry believers that Jesus was wrong (even if it causes theologians to
reinterpret what is meant by 'the kingdom of God'). If Jesus was
framing something like a scientific hypothesis, then it should worry
them. Critics of religion might say that this just shows the manifest
irrationality of religion. But what it suggests to me is that that
something else is going on, other than hypothesis formation.

Religious belief tolerates a high degree of mystery and ignorance in
its understanding of the world. When the devout pray, and their
prayers are not answered, they do not take this as evidence which has
to be weighed alongside all the other evidence that prayer is
effective. They feel no obligation whatsoever to weigh the evidence.
If God does not answer their prayers, well, there must be some
explanation of this, even though we may never know it. Why do people
suffer if an omnipotent God loves them? Many complex answers have been
offered, but in the end they come down to this: it's a mystery.

Science too has its share of mysteries (or rather: things that must
simply be accepted without further explanation). But one aim of
science is to minimize such things, to reduce the number of primitive
concepts or primitive explanations. The religious attitude is very
different. It does not seek to minimize mystery. Mysteries are
accepted as a consequence of what, for the religious, makes the world
meaningful.

This point gets to the heart of the difference between science and
religion. Religion is an attempt to make sense of the world, but it
does not try and do this in the way science does. Science makes sense
of the world by showing how things conform to its hypotheses. The
characteristic mode of scientific explanation is showing how events
fit into a general pattern.

Religion, on the other hand, attempts to make sense of the world by
seeing a kind of meaning or significance in things. This kind of
significance does not need laws or generalizations, but just the sense
that the everyday world we experience is not all there is, and that
behind it all is the mystery of God's presence. The believer is
already convinced that God is present in everything, even if they
cannot explain this or support it with evidence. But it makes sense of
their life by suffusing it with meaning. This is the attitude (seeing
God in everything) expressed in George Herbert's poem, "The Elixir."
Equipped with this attitude, even the most miserable tasks can come to
have value: Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws/ Makes that and th'
action fine.

None of these remarks are intended as being for or against religion.
Rather, they are part of an attempt (by an atheist, from the outside)
to understand what it is. Those who criticize religion should have an
accurate understanding of what it is they are criticizing. But to
understand a world view, or a philosophy or system of thought, it is
not enough just to understand the propositions it contains. You also
have to understand what is central and what is peripheral to the view.
Religions do make factual and historical claims, and if these claims
are false, then the religions fail. But this dependence on fact does
not make religious claims anything like hypotheses in the scientific
sense. Hypotheses are not central. Rather, what is central is the
commitment to the meaningfulness (and therefore the mystery) of the
world.

I have suggested that while religious thinking is widespread in the
world, scientific thinking is not. I don't think that this can be
accounted for merely in terms of the ignorance or irrationality of
human beings. Rather, it is because of the kind of intellectual,
emotional and practical appeal that religion has for people, which is
a very different appeal from the kind of appeal that science has.

Stephen Jay Gould once argued that religion and science are
"non-overlapping magisteria." If he meant by this that religion makes
no factual claims which can be refuted by empirical investigations,
then he was wrong. But if he meant that religion and science are very
different kinds of attempt to understand the world, then he was
certainly right.

Tim Crane is Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Cambridge. He is the author of two books, "The Mechanical Mind" (1995)
and "Elements of Mind" (2001), and several other publications. He is
currently working on two books: one on the representation of the
non-existent and another on atheism and humanism.

<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/mystery-and-evidence/?ref=opinion>
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