Tuesday, February 28, 2012

On the history of abortion

From Robert M. Hardaway, Population, Law, and the Environment, 1994,
pp. 112-113:

Soranos of Ephesus ( A.D. 98-138), "the most learned of GrecoRoman
gynecologists," attributes to Hippocrates a writing in which
Hippocrates himself "told a girl how to accomplish an abortion by
jumping." 30

Aristotle proposed that a mother have an abortion if the state was
unable to accommodate the child. 25 However, he was one of the first
philosophers to make the distinction based on fetal movement (later
known as "quickening"), insisting that any abortion be conducted
before there is "sensation and life." 26 Plato also saw abortion as a
means of attaining an optimum population. 27

...

In any case, Soranos of Ephesus ( A.D. 98-138), "the most learned of
GrecoRoman gynecologists," attributes to Hippocrates a writing in
which Hippocrates himself "told a girl how to accomplish an abortion
by jumping." 30

Noonan, a noted abortion historian, has noted that "in the
Mediterranean world in which Christianity appeared, abortion was a
familiar art." 31 Soranos set forth in a treatise of the day the most
common and familiar methods of abortion: "purging the abdomen with
clysters; walking about vigorously; carrying things beyond one's
strength; bathing in sweet water which is not too hot; bathing in
decoctions of linseed, mallow, and wormwood; applying poultices of the
same decoctions; injecting warm and sweet olive oil; being bled and
then shaken after softening by suppositories." 32 Given these other
less dangerous methods of abortion it is not surprising that
Hippocrates would forbid the use of "deadly drugs" or "pessaries" as a
means of inducing abortion.

By Medieval times, St. Thomas Aquinas had adopted the Aristotelian
notion of quickening. Aquinas "was clear that there was actual
homicide when an ensouled embryo was killed. He was equally clear that
ensoulment did not take place at conception," 33 and stated in
Politicorum that "seed and what is not seed is determined by sensation
and movement." 34

Martin Azplicueta, "the guide in moral questions of three Popes, and
the leading canonist of the 16th century," 35 was a consultant to the
Sacred Penitentiary, "the Roman Tribunal for deciding cases of
conscience submitted to confessors." 36 Historian Noonan has noted
that Azplicueta stated in Consilia that "the rule of the Penitentiary
was to treat a fetus over forty days as ensouled. Hence therapeutic
abortion was accepted in the case of a fetus under this age." 37

On October 29, 1588, however, Pope Sixtus V launched a campaign
against the prostitutes of Rome by issuing the bull Effraenatam that
declared abortion to be homicide regardless of the age of the fetus.
Punishment was to be excommunication, and only the Holy See could
grant absolution from the excommunication. 38 Though this appeared to
be plainly inconsistent with existing dogma, Sixtus, in a fit of pique
and in apparent exasperation with the Roman prostitutes, nevertheless
justified his precedent-breaking bull by rhetorically asking, "Who
would not punish such cruel lust with the most severe punishments?" 39
(Implied in the answer was that a prostitute, when faced with the
severe punishment of excommunication, would choose to carry an
unwanted child as a lesser form of punishment.)

Sixtus V's bull, issued in the heat of a campaign against Roman
prostitutes, and apparently based on the dubious assumption that an
unwanted child was God's retribution for lust, mercifully did not stay
in effect long. Only 2 years later, after Sixtus died, the new Pope
Gregory XIV, noting that "the hoped for fruit had not resulted,"
issued restrictions in 1591 on Effraenatum, "repeal [ing] all its
penalties except those applying to a fetus which had been ensouled."
40 Thus the dogma of Aquinas and Azplicueta was restored. 41

It was not until almost 300 years later, in 1869, that God revealed to
Pope Pius IX that St. Thomas Aquinas, Azplicueta, and Gregory XIV had
all been wrong, and that the abortion of any fetus, regardless of
quickening, was grounds for excommunication.

Sunday, February 12, 2012

Back

After a one-year break from Chronicon Mundi, I plan to start posting
again, perhaps only for myself.

Paul

Endless memory

One of my favorite short stories has long been Borges' Funes el
memorioso (Funes the Memorious, 1942), about a man who, as the
Wikipedia reminds me (because I forget things), is incapable of
Platonic ideas, of generalities, of abstraction and whose world is one
of intolerably uncountable details. Funes finds it very difficult to
sleep, because he remembers "every crevice and every moulding of the
various houses which [surround] him."

Now I learn that Borges was wrong. It turns out that people with
"superior autobiographical memory" are very much capable of the human
capacity for abstraction. The uncountable details of their lives are
not intolerable. Other than remembering everything, or just about
everything that ever happened to them, they are perfectly ordinary
people. Here's a 60 Minutes piece on such people:

Part 1:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=2zTkBgHNsWM

Part 2:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1th1fVIc8Vo&feature=relmfu

Saturday, March 12, 2011

a letter

The following is a letter and the story behind it, from Andrew
Carroll's War Letters: Extraordinary Correspondence from American Wars
(Kindle edition, 86% into the book):


"All letters and artifacts left at the [Vietnam War Memorial] Wall are
collected, catalogued, and preserved by the National Park Service,
National Capital Region. Duery Felton Jr., a park service curator (and
Vietnam veteran himself), was organizing a container of memorabilia
gathered at the Wall when a small photograph and letter left by
another Vietnam veteran caught his attention:

' Nov 18, 1989

Dear Sir,

For twenty two years I have carried your picture in my wallet. I was
only eighteen years old that day that we faced one another on that
trail in Chu Lai, Vietnam. Why you did not take my life I'll never
know. You stared at me for so long armed with your AK-47 and yet you
did not fire. Forgive me for taking your life, I was reacting just the
way I was trained, to kill V. C. or gooks, hell you weren't even
considered human, just gook/target, one in the same.

Since that day in 1967 I have grown a great deal and have a great deal
of respect for life and other peoples in the world.

So many times over the years I have stared at your picture and your
daughter, I suspect. Each time my heart and gut would burn with the
pain of guilt. I have two daughters myself now. One is twenty. The
other one is twenty two, and has blessed me with two granddaughters,
ages one and four.

Today I visit the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in D.C. I have wanted to
come here for several years now to say goodbye to many of my former
comrades.

Somehow I hope and believe they will know I'm here, I truly loved many
of them as I am sure you loved many of your former comrades.

As of today we are no longer enemies. I perceive you as a brave
soldier defending his homeland. Above all else, I can now respect the
importance that life held for you. I suppose that is why I am able to
be here today.

As I leave here today I leave your picture and this letter. It is time
for me to continue the life process and release my pain and guilt.
Forgive me Sir, I shall try to live my life to the fullest, an
opportunity that you and many others were denied.

I'll sign off now Sir, so until we chance to meet again in another
time and place, rest in peace.

Respectfully,
101st Airborne Div Richard A. Luttrell.'

Felton instantly knew he had to include the photography, as well as
several lines from the letter, in an upcoming publication the National
Park Service was assembling called Offerings at the Wall. In 1996 a
good friend of Luttrell's saw the book and shared it with Luttrell,
who had not seen the photograph and the letter since he had left them
at the Wall seven years earlier. Suddenly confronted with them again,
he broke down and cried. The pain of the memory was so great that
Luttrell realized it might never go away unless he tried to return the
photograph to the daughter of the slain Vietnamese soldier. Although
he realized that, without an address or even a name, the odds of
finding someone in a country of 80 million were astronomical, he was
determined to try. Luttrell contacted Felton, who flew to Illinois and
personally returned the items. And then, with assistance from the
Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, Luttrell was able to convince
newspapers in Hanoi with an accompanying article. Miraculously, a copy
of a paper made its way to a tiny farming village where the family of
the soldier recognized it. Several days later Luttrell received a
short, translated letter, forwarded from Vietnam by fax, written by a
woman identified only as Lan. The message read:

Dear Mr. Richard, the child that you have taken care of, or through
the picture, for over 30 years, she becomes adult now, and she has
spent so much sufferance in her childhood by the missing of her
father. I hope you will bring the joy and happiness to my family.

Luttrell immediately responded and asked Lan if he could visit her in
Vietnam. She said yes, and in March 2000 Richard Luttrell—the first
time he had been back in thirty-two years—found himself face-to-face
with Lan in her village. The moment she saw him, Lan burst into tears
and embraced Luttrell. 'I'm so sorry,' he said to her, also crying.
Lan forgave Luttrell, and the photograph of her and her father now
rests on a small altar in Lan's home."

Here is the photograph:

http://tinyurl.com/69pzwe4


--

Tuesday, March 8, 2011

Women

This morning's International Herald Tribune reports: "women make up 54
percent of physicians below the age of 35 in Britain, 58 percent in
France and almost 64 percent in Spain." And last year, the Washington
Post reported: "For the first time, more women than men in the United
States received doctoral degrees last year." The times they are
a-changin'.

--

Saturday, February 26, 2011

The Stutterer

The Stutterer

http://www.slate.com/id/2285533/pagenum/all/

How he makes his voice heard.

By Nathan Heller

Behind bold facades lie a thousand small humiliations. Abraham Lincoln
grew so depressive that he couldn't, for a while, be trusted near
sharp objects. Ella Fitzgerald started her singing career after being
too ashamed to dance publicly. Susan Sontag came upon an issue of
Partisan Review as a teenager, found it totally impenetrable, and
spent the rest of her life trying never to be that unsophisticated
again. Some version of these unlikely equations lies behind The King's
Speech, the account of King George VI's crippling stutter that has
brought in tides of coverage and praise since its release late last
year. The movie describes the king's struggles to speak in the run-up
to his coronation and the start of World War II. Along the way, it
turns a spotlight on a barely understood disorder—one that, as it
happens, wasn't just a royal problem. Winston Churchill stuttered,
too, although the movie barely mentions the fact, making for an irony
that's striking even in a wartime history soaked with it: At a moment
when the nation's future rested on the power of public oratory, both
of Britain's highest leaders had a harder time speaking a sentence
than most people in the street.

The King's Speech has been quite successful—some people are expecting
it to walk away with many of this week's top Oscars—but it's vague on
certain key points. Even after seeing the film, viewers don't really
know what to make of George VI's stuttering. Roger Ebert saw a monarch
who "seizes up in agony" at the idea of speaking; Anthony Lane came
away assuming that the king's trouble exposed a deep childhood shame.
In the film, George VI's therapy, charged with heavy social and
Freudian overtones, becomes a metaphor for "bridging the gap between
classes," as the Daily News put it, and perhaps even the "unconscious
equation of words with feces," J. Hoberman wryly wrote. Or something.
For a movie that's supposed to be about finding one's voice, The
King's Speech raises more questions about life with the problem than
it answers.

Stuttering, in my mind, is a word that conjures beiges and grays: the
feeling of always being lusterless and square in conversation; of
woozy headaches brought about by gasping through my sentences; of
childhood boredom in stuffy, cork-tiled offices where speech
therapists told me to slow down and read long lists of words aloud.
Somehow, I never wanted to slow down, and still don't; and in this
respect stuttering also signifies a bargain I have spent adult life
trying not to make. The disorder is not what might be called "a given"
from birth for me, though it's been a looming specter for as long as
my memory reaches. I started speaking in sentences shortly before
turning 1. At 3, those sentences first met with some resistance on my
tongue, the way a car moves off asphalt, onto dirt—and then, finally,
across rocks that jolt the tires and make it hard to track where you
are headed. Today, I am still being jolted, and the jagged terrain
behind bears the track marks of my own innumerable small humiliations.
In the seventh grade: A substitute asks the class to read out loud,
and when I stumble over my first sentence, she inquires of the other
students whether I'm "OK" and "always like this," and while I continue
fighting with a pr sound, my ears tune in to every judging shudder in
the room—the creaking chairs, the restless exhalations, the
uncomfortable shifting, in the desk beside me, of a girl with many
colored pens who seems to me in some way very beautiful. In high
school: A medical assistant taking down my charts asks whether I just
have a problem with my speech or whether there is mental retardation,
too. ("As far as I'm aware …" my answer begins.) In college: I slow
down several seminars trundling through fragile language meant for
clever tongues. And so on. In each case, what I feel most impelled to
explain to the people who can hear me is just: This is not my voice.

The stutterer's voice is the central focus of The King's Speech and a
good part of the reason, I suspect, the movie has achieved its outsize
resonance. This is because the stutterer's voice points toward a
paradox of verbal culture: Language was born of a need to communicate
orally and in the moment, and yet, at its most influential, language
is so little dependent on spontaneous speech that even someone
permanently stymied on that front—a stutterer—can eke out a message
that commands a nation. It is reassuring to know this, partly because
it affirms that there is more to public meaning and shared truth than
smooth talk and rhetorical style. In a moment when the words of
leadership are routinely distrusted as fleeting or opportunistic, The
King's Speech champions a notion of the public voice as something
impervious to glib manipulation. The difficulty of the stutterer's
speech proves its good faith.

For stuttering people themselves, though, it proves something else,
which is that personal voices, the link between the mind and the world
outside, can come from places other than the larynx and the
spontaneous moment. About 1 percent of the world's population
stutters, four times more men than women, but the problem is, as far
as science and treatment goes, largely a mystery. It's not a
psychological hang-up—brain imagery has found actual differences in
stutterers' speech-production neurobiology—yet it's subject to some
psychological influence all the same: Most stutterers report
stuttering more or less in certain situations and under certain
pressures, though the triggers are opaque and ever-changing.
Stuttering is genetic, but it's unclear how the gene governs the
problem. (Researchers have pinpointed a mutation on the 12th
chromosome that's apparently responsible, but that mutation is in a
region normally associated with serious disorders like Tay-Sachs
disease, with which stuttering seemingly shares no similarities.)
There is no cure for stuttering or even, really, an agreed-upon
approach to treatment. Many people who have spoken smoothly for years
still think of themselves as stutterers, since the possibility of
blocking any moment never goes away.

It's hard to describe the feeling of stuttering to anyone who has
always spoken smoothly. It is not a nervous impulse. It is not,
despite appearances, a spastic feeling. Stuttering starts in the voice
box and the upper lungs with something like a pressure clench, the
sensation of some valves closing against a flow, a trap tripping its
release at the wrong moment. (John Updike described it as the feeling
of "a kind of windowpane suddenly inserted in front of my face while I
was talking, or of an obdurate barrier thrust into my throat.") The
clench occurs suddenly, irreversibly—in the final instant before
beginning a sentence, in the middle of a phrase—making the experience
of being a stutterer somewhat like the chronic knowledge that your
clothes may explode off your body any moment. You stay on your toes
for sudden self-embarrassment. Your sole object, when a verbal block
comes, is to break past. Most of the quintessential tics of
stuttering—the repetitions, hisses, swallows, blinks, head shakes,
gulps, silences—are coping mechanisms, habituated tricks for pushing
beyond this impasse in the throat. Why anyone would ever persist in
such tics is perhaps best answered by the predicament of a swimmer
cramping in the middle of a river. Part by reflex and part by urgent
pragmatism, you dispense with any hope of an elegant stroke and flail
toward the far shore. If you give up completely, or fall silent too
long, there's the risk that you'll be swept entirely under, lose your
meaning.

Meaning is crucial here, because most stutterers feel in constant
danger of being misunderstood in at least three separate ways. There
are, first, the communication risks of trying not to stutter. Speech,
for a stutterer, is a chess game; it is not uncommon for our minds to
be running three or four sentences ahead of our lips, with constant
backtracking and recalibration along the way. In some cases, people
known as "covert stutterers" or "closet stutterers" go through life
apparently speaking smoothly but actually living like deer in season,
constantly fleeing from words and situations that might spell trouble.
Churchill—who rehearsed his speeches obsessively and faced the day
buffered by epic rations of whisky—is sometimes said to have been a
deft closet stutterer in maturity, his celebrated verbal dexterity
being just that, a means of maneuvering away from danger. Flight,
though, has a cost. When words change, meaning does also. This is true
in the literal sense (in my most craven moments, facing an impatient
cashier at a busy lunch spot, I've ordered the most safely
pronounceable sandwich on the menu, which is usually turkey) and in
more oblique ways, too. Not long ago, Joe Biden, who stuttered openly
into college, undertook a famously weird circumlocution seemingly to
avoid landing on the word Avatar—a sound that he'd just nearly blocked
on. The hesitation was roundly interpreted as a sign not of speech
trouble but of mind trouble, and, in some sense, maybe it was. To
word-substitute is to substitute one kind of verbal control for
another, to feel your speech slowly drifting away from the voice in
your head.

When stutterers don't succeed in sidestepping an obstacle, or aren't
comfortable living with their words at such a remove from their
thoughts, there is the problem of being literally understood.
Stuttering ravages the sentence, the sentiment, the idea, such that
following the stutterer's train of syntax can be like trying to parse
a line of Morse code. (Biden was nicknamed Dash in high school.) If
you happen to be a verbally minded stuttering person, this is
something you never get used to. Part of your mind holds onto the hope
of speaking clever things as effortlessly as you think of them, of
being witty and charming; words you wish you had the tongue to say
instead flourish inside, feeding a sort of verbal fantasy life.
Everybody dreams. But stutterers, perhaps especially, dream of verbal
transcendence: those rare moments when an ungainly cargo of words
rattling down the runway pulls itself together, roars into a final
burst of speed, and meets the sky.

Sometimes, this dream gets fixed enough to become a vocation. A
disproportionate number of stutterers end up writers, actors, and
other voices of public life. They tend even to "do jobs that require
them to speak in public, which you would have thought they'd have
avoided," someone pointed out to the stuttering novelist Margaret
Drabble. This is an irony only until you realize that the labor of a
verbal craftsperson, the work of nailing words onstage or in print, is
virtually coterminous with a stutterer's inner life. Sometimes a
stuttering actor's efforts to speak smoothly in the spotlight help
shape an iconic voice. James Earl Jones found he stuttered least when
he spoke at the bottom of his register and from a script. (Otherwise,
he's said, he struggles just to get "though the conversation.")
Marilyn Monroe went breathy, probably because people generally don't
stutter when they're whispering, and used ditsy-seeming pauses to
inhale and wait for her vocal chords to relax. Rowan Atkinson, who had
trouble with B and P words, developed a method of exploding past those
consonants with comic exaggeration ("Just popped out for lunch!").
Bruce Willis says being taunted for stuttering taught him "how to
fight."

The disorder teaches different things to writers, such as how a
sentence can fly when it is freed from the requirements of speech.
Writing as a vocation tends to attract control freaks, pathological
introverts, and uneasy narcissists—the sort of people, basically, who
don't mind spending hours alone at a desk, trying to make their own
ideas sound good on a piece of paper—but for stutterers, the endless
possibilities for voice control on the blank page carry especial
appeal. Give a stutterer a pen and some practice and, suddenly, what
seems imperfectible in speech is a few scribblings and crossings-out
and rescribblings away. ("[T]his anxious guilty blockage in the
throat," Updike wrote, "I managed to maneuver several millions of
words around it.") Even a partial list of stuttering writers points to
certain correlations between the impediment and the development of
literary voice: Updike, Drabble, Jorge Luis Borges, Robert A.
Heinlein, W. Somerset Maugham, at various points Christopher Hitchens
and the Dunne brothers (John Gregory and Dominick), Philip Larkin,
John Bayley, Elizabeth Bowen—and so on, back to Henry James.

In retrospect, James' impediment seems to gape back at us from every
lavish, stylized page of his prose. Who but a speech-blocked writer
would devote so much energy and ink to writing, rewriting, and
overwriting such a body of work? Who else would dwell so hungrily on
the rhythms and refracted meanings of the social sphere? As much as
James is a literary paragon, he is the person many stutterers spend
their whole lives trying not to be: the eagle-eyed wallflower, the
brilliant nonparticipant, a man so disengaged from normal social
congress that there's been scholarly debate on the extent to which he
was straight or gay or, as one theory has it, neutered on a fence.
This is the final and most insidious way stutterers fear being
misunderstood: They worry that their speaking voice, and the behavior
that accompanies it, will be taken as a window onto something like
their personality.

Well, why not? In most cases, the way adults carry themselves in the
social world betrays at least something about who they are. They can
be loud, timid, outgoing, punctilious, nonchalant, or devastatingly
clever, and these qualities are taken as facets of the self because
they are the products of control—you choose to keep silent, to make
snotty remarks, to turn your energy to one-liners. Stutterers lack
control. Our options are to speak at the mercy of our physiology or
not speak. Our social conduct, as a result, can be baffling.
Stutterers are frequently cast or cast themselves in roles on the
periphery: the Prufrock, the arbiter, the jester, the confidant, the
third wheel, the nonthreatening best friend. (Elsewhere in Slate,
Barry Harbaugh has published a comprehensive and illuminating study of
stuttering stereotypes in film.) But these roles are seldom perfect
fits. Close friends of mine report seeing flickers of another mien
beneath my normal milquetoast awkwardness. Women I've known well have
mentioned their "surprise" (this is the word that crops up, always)
at—actually, I've never been sure at what, exactly, but the intimation
hints at my worst fear: that people expect my stutterer's cloddish
surface to be representative, to permeate my personality like a pool
of ink.

This fear of being misapprehended may in fact have some influence on
stuttering itself. Alfred Kazin stopped stuttering badly as soon as he
made a name (and voice) for himself publishing in august magazines.
Samuel L. Jackson found he was miraculously fluent when he spoke as
any character other than himself. Escape from one's stutter means
escape from misjudgment, which is to say from the expressions often
writ too clearly in a listener's face: The looks I've gotten when I
start to stutter—eyebrows raised in surprise or else cocked in pity,
pressed lips and sidelong glances of impatience—could, honestly,
furnish albums. I tend to glance away when I'm stuck, not so much in
chagrin as to avoid subjecting someone else, and especially a friend,
to my own scrutinizing gaze: They shouldn't have to be on camera in an
awkward moment. I have stuttered nearly all my conscious life, but I
still fight the urge to apologize every time it happens.

I will probably always be tempted to apologize, or else to pretend
that the problem doesn't exist. If there's pain to this disorder, it
is not from looking silly—that is easy to get used to, easy to forget.
What's harder is the difficulty breaking through, working your way
into those hidden chambers where social transcendence takes place and
lives are made. It is one thing, after all, to go passably through the
motions of everyday discussion: making small talk over lunch, putting
in phone calls, eking out a decent story at a cocktail party. It's
another to run fast through the tight, quieter, moonlit streets of
banter or seduction using speech that feels as dexterous as a loaded
bus. Of all the minor pricks and pinches stuttering has given to me
over time, the only ones that still sting are the moments when I've
watched people kick off their heels and steal into that dark maze with
the realization that I won't be able to follow them apace. To stutter
is to be perpetually caught in what some people like to call
"nostalgia for the present."

Longing is, at bottom, a creative impulse. "There's no doubt in my
mind that you're destined to end up a writer," a college teacher once
told me. "You have all the right problems." The constant wistful sense
of loss, the need to slow it all down for the capture before it drifts
away—this is why writers put things into words. The premise of The
King's Speech is that George VI speaks for his people and their plight
and for posterity. This is a stutterer's fantasy of voice, a fantasy
about the nearly cosmic virtue of fighting to get the words out. But
it's our cultural fantasy, too. There's an implication in the movie,
in the king's pleased exodus from his broadcasting room, that all has
now been said: The language is pronounced, the meaning safeguarded in
history. Maybe it is. Maybe, as so many stutterers would hope, our
public, prepared voices reach farther than our real ones, and the
words we shape still sing beyond our time.

Or maybe their effect is smaller, more specific. Several years ago, I
had my own tiny King's Speech-like moment. For various reasons, I was
expected to deliver a longish address at my high-school graduation,
and after composing it—the easy part—I turned to a speech therapist
and rehearsed as if it were a Chopin nocturne. By the time the
ceremony arrived, I knew every word and flection of that speech, which
I had printed out in 16-point font, 1.5-spaced. I read it smoothly at
the graduation, just the way a nonstuttering person might. But it is
not a victory I frequently return to. "You have such perseverance,
Bertie, you're the bravest man I know," George VI's therapist tells
him in The King's Speech—yet it's hard to see how this could possibly
be true. In the end, a stutterer's real measure of bravery is the same
as anybody else's, and it doesn't have to do with persevering to
accomplish, with effort, what other people manage effortlessly. The
far greater challenge is—and this is more frightening than any
podium—working up the strength to make a leap that even fluent
speakers wouldn't dare.

--

Sunday, February 20, 2011

虎妈

张鸣:"虎妈"的中国式尴尬

http://view.news.qq.com/a/20110215/000042.htm

2011年02月15日08:35新闻晨报张鸣我要评论(6)
字号:T|T
张鸣 人民大学教授

美籍华裔女教授蔡美儿高调张扬中国式家庭教育,点爆了美国,当然可以理解。但是,这位被称为"虎妈"的华裔所引起的争议,居然延烧到了中国,却让美国人感到有些意外。在他们看来,中国的家庭教育,就是虎妈式的。他们不知道,现在的中国,至少在城市,虎妈式的教育,已经早就变味了。

说起来,几千年来,中国的家庭教育,基本就是虎妈式的,不大注重孩子的自主性,以父母的意志为意志,强制,甚至还要加上棍棒。按现代儿童教育理念,这样的教育当然不好,不符合儿童的心理,不尊重儿童的人格。但是,我们也得承认,这样的教育,也教出来一些人才。那么些杰出人士,大体上在家里都是这样过来的。相反,在转型时期,那些不按老一套教儿子的名人,比如胡适、鲁迅和老舍,他们教出来的儿子反而不如老子优秀。人有自由的天性,也有逃避自由的天性,儿童更是如此。如果父母的意志适合这个孩子的实际,强制灌输进去,只要没有引起激烈的反弹,还就是能有效。当然,这样的成功,背后的风险也很大,古来不成材的人也多了去了,即使像虎妈这样的美籍华人,也不见得教育个个成功,失败的例子也不少。

其实问题最大的,是现在的中国家庭。只生一个好的独生子女家庭,教育起来,一点都不好。过去严父式的棍棒教育,早已经被放弃,一边是溺爱,一边是苛责;一边恨不得让孩子学会世界上所有的本事,一边拿孩子对常规学习的抗拒却毫无办法。他们的家庭教育,就是鼓励孩子学习,只要学习,就可以不做任何家务,甚至学校的卫生,都由家长代劳。孩子花钱,只要家长有这个能力,就没有节制,怎么花,都不会受到责备。当然,如果孩子真的反抗,不听招呼,家长基本上束手无策。很多家长,在孩子面前没有丝毫的权威,说句话,还不如孩子的玩伴管用。

在这里,我们看到,传统的家庭教育模式已经变了,没有人敢用棍棒教出孝子来,强制伴随着收买,强制按家长的意志学一大堆东西,得到的是不用干家务,花钱如流水。如果孩子最终不肯学了,依然还可以骄纵如故,往后不找工作,在家啃老,家长也只有徒呼奈何。当然,即使这样的教育,也有成功的例子,也有的孩子,虽然自理能力低下,但确实学了一堆的特长,在学校成绩也不错,最后还能考出国去,变成什么"哈佛女孩"之类的榜样。

但是,我们必须承认,中国国内这样的家庭教育,旧的已去,新的不来,所带来的隐患,实际上要比美国的华裔虎妈大到不知多少倍。虎妈严苛的督责式教育,毕竟有美国的社会和学校作为补充,而我们这里却没有。不仅没有,学校和社会,在教育方面,跟家庭教育一样不靠谱。在这种整体教育环境下,孩子不知感恩,没有责任,不懂自立。最终的恶果,往往在孩子成人、走向社会之后,才可能充分显现。
(新闻晨报)

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Language and (post) colonialism

"Take colonial India. A great debate ensued in 1830s Britain on the
choice of an official language of colonial administration and
education. Making the winning case for English over Sanskrit, Persian,
and others, Thomas B. Macaulay—a member of the Supreme Council of
India—observed that Indian languages 'contain neither literary nor
scientific information, and are, moreover, so poor and rude that,
until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy
to translate any valuable work into them.' He admitted that he did not
know any Indian language but had nevertheless reached 'a correct
estimate of their value.' Citing the Orientalists of his day, he said,
'I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf
of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of
India and Arabia.' Therefore, concluded Macaulay, 'we have to educate
a people who cannot at present be educated by means of their mother
tongue. We must teach them some foreign language.' [2]

Language is not a neutral vessel for conveying the ideas, beliefs, and
values that constitute culture. Nor is it a mere tool for describing
the world as it truly is—no language can be said to describe the world
as it truly is. To use a language—any language—is to interpret the
world in a particular way... "

More here:

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/02/decolonizing-my-mind.html

Saturday, February 5, 2011

TLS: Delusions of Gender

Delusions of Gender
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/the_tls/article7171325.ece

________________________________
From The Times Literary Supplement
January 26, 2011

The new neurosexism

Cordelia Fine has produced a witty and meticulously researched exposé
of the sloppy studies that pass for scientific evidence in so many of
today's bestselling books on sex differences

Carol Tavris

Wandering wombs, an anatomically conferred destiny of penis envy and
masochism, smaller brains, smaller frontal lobes, larger frontal
lobes, right-hemisphere dominance, cross-hemisphere interaction, too
much oestrogen, not enough testosterone – all have been invoked to
explain why women are intellectually inferior to men, more emotional,
less logical, better at asking for directions, worse at map reading,
hopeless at maths and science, and ever so much better suited to jobs
involving finger dexterity, nappies and dishes. Today we look back
with amusement at the efforts of nineteenth-century scientists to
weigh, cut, split or dissect brains in their pursuit of finding the
precise anatomical reason for female inferiority. How much more
scientific and unbiased we are today, we think, with our PET scans and
fMRIs and sophisticated measurements of hormone levels. Today's
scientists would never commit such a methodological faux pas as
failing to have a control group or knowing the sex of the brain they
are dissecting – would they? Brain scans don't lie – do they?

Well, yes, they would and they do. As Cordelia Fine documents in
Delusions of Gender, researchers change their focus, technology
marches on, but sexism is eternal. Its latest incarnation is what she
calls "neurosexism", sexist bias disguised in the "neuroscientific
finery" of claims about neurons, brains, hormones. Fine was spurred to
write her critique, she says, when she found her son's kindergarten
teacher reading a book that claimed a young boy's brain was incapable
of forging the connection between emotion and language. The result of
Fine's irritation is a witty and meticulously researched exposé of the
sloppy studies that pass for scientific evidence in so many of today's
bestselling books on sex differences, notably Louann Brizendine's The
Female Brain, Simon Baron-Cohen's The Essential Difference, Michael
Gurian's What Could He Be Thinking? and similar books published by his
Gurian Institute. Other popular books about leadership, marital
problems, parenting and education likewise claim that males and
females are hard-wired to misunderstand each other, to have different
interests and skills, to learn differently, and to differ in empathy,
logic and the ability to see forests or trees.

"We have been here before, so many times", writes Fine, with a sigh.
No one disputes that the sexes differ physiologically, in hormones and
anatomy, or that there are sex differences in the brain related to
men's and women's different reproductive processes. The eternal
question is, and has been, so what? What, if anything, do those
differences have to do with work, love, success, ambition, talent,
love of sports, and who does the housework? Perhaps they do, says
Fine, but "when we follow the trail of contemporary science we
discover a surprising number of gaps, assumptions, inconsistencies,
poor methodologies, and leaps of faith – as well as more than one echo
of the insalubrious past". Fine takes us with her along that trail as
she looks up studies reported by Brizendine and Baron-Cohen, among
other authors, showing us time and again how their claims go far
beyond the research they cite. For example, she tracked down every
single neuroscience study that Brizendine cited as evidence for
feminine superiority in empathy and "mind reading", the alleged reason
that wives know what their husbands are thinking before their husbands
do. (They do?) She found "the deployment of some rather misleading
practices", which proves to be an understatement. Brizendine claims
that the female brain has more mirror neurons (brain cells that fire
in mimicry when a person or animal observes others carrying out an
action) than the male brain, hence enabling greater female empathy.
Brizendine has five references for this assertion: one study,
published in Russian, of a postmortem dissection of frontal lobes, in
which mirror neurons could therefore not be observed in action; three
studies of mirror neurons, none of which compared males and females;
and one "personal communication" with a cognitive neuroscientist at
Harvard, who, when asked by Fine to confirm the finding, said that not
only had she never communicated with Brizendine; her own work had also
failed to find any sex differences in mirror neuron functioning.

Empathic skills are central to the female stereotype, and most people
will tell you that "women" in some vague generic way are better than
"men" at them. On self-report questionnaires, women are more likely
than men to describe themselves as being high in empathy. This
response reflects social desirability, wishful thinking and role
obligations, but is not to be taken as evidence that women actually
are more empathic, though Baron-Cohen, Brizendine, and many others do.
Unfortunately, what people say about themselves, on any trait or
behaviour from kindness and altruism to obedience and cruelty, is
almost entirely unrelated to how they actually behave in various
situations. Baron-Cohen's questionnaires to measure "Empathy Quotient"
and "Systemising Quotient" are prime examples of this flaw. According
to Baron-Cohen, a person high in affective empathy, seeing a woman in
pain, will "automatically feel concern, wince, and feel a desire to
run across and help alleviate her pain"; and it is women on average
who are "predominantly hard-wired" to do that wincing and alleviating.
What about men who wince and rush to alleviate the pain of a person
trapped in a mine or of their children who have taken a tumble? And
which women? Under what circumstances? Empathy towards whom? Are women
more empathic toward their enemies, familial or national, than men
are? Hardly. (Mirror neurons go to sleep when people are observing
members of an out-group.) Over and over, if you watch what people do
rather than what they say they would do, and vary the situations in
which they do it, gender differences fade to the vanishing point. As
Fine puts it, "Pick a gender difference, any difference. Now watch
very closely as – poof! – it's gone".

All right, so it's not mirror neurons; it's brain lateralization! Here
the view is that male brains are lateralized for certain functions,
such as verbal skills, whereas women have a larger corpus callosum,
the bundle of fibres connecting the two brain hemispheres, and process
the same skills on both sides of the brain. These physiological
differences allegedly make women better at communicating across their
own brains and to other people. Scientists have been trying valiantly
to drive a stake through the heart of this unsupported idea for forty
years. I took a stab at it in 1992; but it is like the kudzu vine,
growing and strangling everything in its path. Fine summarizes thus:
"Nonexistent sex differences in language lateralization, mediated by
nonexistent sex differences in corpus callosum structure, are widely
believed to explain nonexistent sex differences in language skills".
The bottom line: even when brain scans have shown that some males and
females have different patterns of brain activity while they are
performing a task, their actual performance on that task has not
differed. Yet a difference in performance is presumably the thing to
be explained.

So maybe the difference isn't in mirror neurons or brain
lateralization; it's hormones! "Without testosterone interfering, your
daughter develops not only female genitalia but a decidedly female
brain", says It's a Baby Girl!, another of the Gurian Institute books
that promote the "hard-wired differences" argument: "It is your
daughter's girl brain that will direct her female approach to the
world". But what is a "female approach to the world" – one unaffected
by a woman's religion, culture, social class, age and generation,
occupation, nationality, geographic location? For Baron-Cohen, the
surge of foetal testosterone explains why no woman has won the Fields
Medal in maths; for Brizendine, it explains why girls are better at
"communication, observation, and processing of information". Yet
again, when Fine goes to the studies that are cited in support of the
foetal testosterone argument, she finds oversimplification at best and
disconfirmation of the prediction at worst. For example, Baron-Cohen
and his colleagues hypothesized that pregnant women who had higher
levels of amniotic testosterone should have children (of either sex)
with lower levels of empathizing skills, as measured by frequency of
eye contact at age one year with a parent during play, quality of
social relationships at age four years, and scores on the child
version of his Empathy Quotient measure. But the findings – which Fine
describes in detail in her notes, for readers interested in the data
and their analysis – did not support the hypothesis in any clear way.
"Higher foetal testosterone in nonclinical populations", she
concludes, "has not been convincingly linked with better mental
rotation ability, systemising ability, mathematical ability,
scientific ability or worse mind reading". Fine finds no strong link
between "a clear hormonal beginning, a neat neural middle, and a
convincing behavioural end", though endocrinologists have spent
decades trying to find it. The link eludes them, as it eludes everyone
in the hard-wired-differences camp, because social experiences and the
environment muddy the path between hormones and behaviour, as between
brain structure and behaviour, and even between genetic
predispositions and behaviour. These are not one-way streets. Culture,
experience, the environment and our behaviour in everyday life are
constantly influencing and shaping our brains, hormones and the
expression of genes.

Fine's romp through the fields of neurosexism is sandwiched between
two other sections; in the first, she explores the unsexy, low-tech,
but primary causes of gender differences in achievement: the
persistence of discrimination, subtle and blatant, that convey the
message to women – "You don't belong here", and the institutional
rules, explicit and implicit, that impede advancement – or make it
possible; after all, the international rise of women in law, medicine,
science, bartending and the military did not occur because their
brains became less lateralized. The final section examines the
socialization of children and the phenomenon that draws so many
parents to the notion that sex differences are innate: the
sex-stereotyped play choices and behaviours of their toddlers. Parents
aren't wrong in what they observe. They are wrong only in assuming
that their child's preferences at the age of three, four or five has
anything at all to do with what that child will grow up to become.
"Three- to six-year-olds are the Gender Police", says the sociologist
John Gagnon, their little minds busy sorting out what it means to be
male or female. (After dinner at an Italian restaurant, a
four-year-old in one study told his parents that he'd got the answer:
"Men eat pizza and women don't".) As Fine explains, this is a
cognitive phase, and as children's cognitive flexibility matures,
stereotypes soften. She reviews the extensive interdisciplinary
research on the influences on children's gender development, showing
how the cognitive rigidities of early childhood are outgrown. But she
fears that the belief that sex differences are hard-wired in the brain
is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy among parents and educators.
That's why Harry won't listen to me; his poor deficient brain deafens
him. That's why Sally isn't doing well at maths; her brain isn't wired
for it. That's why men are so bad at housework; the poor guys don't
have enough oxytocin, a nurturing hormone. That's why my child has
such rigid play preferences; sexism is innate.

Perhaps the most succinct rebuttal to the current epidemic of books on
hard-wired sex differences is the quote that Fine found from Margaret
Thatcher, who said, in 1971, "I don't think that in my lifetime there
will be a woman Prime Minister". Can we stop talking about brains now?
Those who can't, and anyone else who would like to know what today's
best science reveals about gender differences – and similarities –
could not do better than read this book.

Cordelia Fine DELUSIONS OF GENDER The real science behind sex differences
338pp. Icon Books. £14.99.
978 1 84831 163 3

Carol Tavris, a social psychologist, is the co-author of The Longest
War: Sex differences in perspective, 1977, and the author of The
Mismeasure of Woman: Why women are not the better sex, the inferior
sex, or the opposite sex, 1992.